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21 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**

22 **DISTRICT OF NEVADA**

23 KARL HANSEN,

24 Plaintiff,

25 v.

26 ELON MUSK; TESLA, INC.; TESLA  
27 MOTORS, INC.; U.S. SECURITY  
28 ASSOCIATES; *et al.*

29 Defendant(s).

30 Case No.: 3-19-cv-00413-LRH-WGC

31 **PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO  
32 DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS**

33 Plaintiff Karl Hansen, by and through counsel, submits this opposition to both motions  
34 to dismiss brought by Defendants Tesla, Inc., ("Tesla") Tesla Motors, Inc. ("Tesla Motors"),  
35 Elon Musk ("Musk"), and U.S. Security Associates, Inc. ("USSA") (collectively, the  
36 "Defendants").

## PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Hansen submitted filed his Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) whistleblower retaliation claims with OSHA on December 18, 2018. Hansen filed the instant Complaint on July 19, 2019, after it was administratively exhausted. All claims other than his SOX retaliation claims were compelled to be resolved into arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement, and the instant SOX claim was stayed pending those proceedings. On June 8, 2022, Judge Hoffman issued a Final Award for the Defendants on all arbitrated claims, and on June 17, 2022, Tesla Parties moved to lift the stay and, on August 15, 2022, filed the instant Motion to Dismiss. USSA’s Motion for the same followed on August 16, 2022.

## STATEMENT OF FACTS

On August 3, 2018, Hansen, who had previously worked for Tesla but was at that point an hourly employee of USSA working on a Tesla contract at the Gigafactory, wrote an email directly to Musk in which he outlined his concerns about what he had seen at Gigafactory 1. Ex 5. In his email Hansen raised concerns about allegations of cartel activity at Gigafactory 1 and stated that he had concerns that there was cartel involvement in the supply of lithium for batteries for Model 3 production at Gigafactory 1. *Id.* Hansen also detailed significant theft of parts of tools at Gigafactory 1 that could pose safety risks to employees. *Id.* He also reported that the theft at Gigafactory 1 was widespread and organized and that he had discovered the improper award of contracts.

Tesla Party corporate representative Jacob Nocon testified that this was the last thing Musk and the Tesla Parties needed on August 3, 2018, as the stakes for the Tesla Parties were high at that moment in time. Hearing Transcript, 358:21 to 359:25. In response to Hansen’s email, Nick Gicinto asked the employee relations and legal departments to begin an investigation into Hansen and his allegations, and escalated the investigation directly to Musk, who opined that Hansen

1 sounded “like a conspiracy nut.” Ex. 5. If Hansen’s internal email was a problem when “Tesla  
2 was struggling financially” given “the perilous situation that the company was in,” one can only  
3 imagine what the reaction was when the Tesla Parties first learned on August 16, 2018, that  
4 Hansen submitted a TCR to the Securities & Exchange Commission alleging that various material  
5 omissions and misstatements were made by Tesla to the investing public in violation of sections  
6 17(a) (2) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933. Ex. 2.

7 On August 16, 2018, a reporter emailed Musk and asked, “Would you like to comment  
8 on the contents of the SEC tip from Karl Hansen?” Ex. 4. The reporter detailed the allegations of  
9 securities fraud made by Hansen as detailed in Hansen’s attorney’s press release. *Id.*

10 On August 23, 2018, Kenneth Davis, part of Tesla’s investigations team, sent an email to  
11 Tesla’s Global Head of Security Jeff Jones and Musk with the subject line, “Karl Hansen – SEC  
12 Whistleblower – Immediate attention?” Ex. 3. Davis sent photos of Hansen working at the Main  
13 Lobby Entrance and reported that he “wanted to bring your attention to, what to me, is a very  
14 disturbing observation of an incident that could lead to devastating ramifications to the security  
15 of the Gigafactory, as well as damaging effects to the company as a whole.”

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
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**From:** Kenneth Davis [kendavis@tesla.com]  
**Sent:** 8/23/2018 11:02:03 AM  
**To:** Jeff Jones [jeff.jones@tesla.com]  
**CC:** Elon Musk [erm@tesla.com]  
**Subject:** Karl Hansen- SEC Whistleblower- Immediate attention?



Good morning Jeff,

My name is Ken Davis and I am currently part of the Investigations Team at Gigafactory 1. I wanted to bring your attention to, what to me, is a very disturbing observation of an incident that could lead to devastating ramifications to the security of the Gigafactory, as well as damaging effects to the company as a whole.

The above photo snippets, obtained live on 8-22-2018 (yesterday) depict a single U.S. Security Guard manning the Lima 1 position (Main Lobby Entrance) at GF1. This guard is none other than Karl Hansen, the ex-Tesla

1 Security Guard and current party to the SEC-Whistleblower legal issue. The Lima 1 position is, in my  
 2 opinion, the first line and most important level of security in the facility, as we no longer scan badges at the  
 3 North Gate Employee Entrance. What I find extremely disturbing and potentially dangerous is the fact that an  
 4 ex-Tesla Security Guard, who is a current party to an active SEC Investigation against Tesla and has already  
 5 displayed acts of very questionable character, is at this time the sole gatekeeper and first contact for visitors  
 6 and employees at the Gigafactory.

7 At the moment these snippets were obtained Mr Hansen not only has access to the Gigafactory shared drives  
 8 from the desktop on the post desk, but also has the ability to allow entrance into the facility to any one person  
 9 he chooses. Kind of like the wolf guarding the hen house. The ability at this time for Mr Hansen to  
 10 possibly allow unrestricted and unfettered access to either an investigator for Attorney Stuart  
 11 Meissner, a reporter, or any other individual(s) with nefarious incentives, to the internal areas of  
 12 the Gigafactory is not only available but would seem very likely, given his individual monetary incentive as a  
 13 part of the current and active lawsuit. Also, the observation of a proven disgruntled ex-employee walking  
 14 around the facility with a large unchecked backpack over his shoulders, is horrifying at the least.

15 I will admit that I am not currently privileged to nor aware of any possible legalities/contractual issues  
 16 between Tesla and U.S. Security; therefore, if Tesla Security is aware of and is handling the issue, I will  
 17 apologize for taking your time. However, knowing the devastating effects that this situation could lead to, I  
 18 feel it is my responsibility, as well as my duty, to raise awareness to the situation.

19 Also, I would like to address the current possible SEC investigation as it pertains to Mr Hansen. I was  
 20 designated by my Supervisor, Sean Gouthro, as Mr Hansen's trainer when he tentatively joined the  
 21 Investigations team. I also worked side by side in the same room during the same shift as Mr Hansen. Because  
 22 of this, I am privileged to possess intimate details into the supposed "cartel" investigation Mr. Hansen  
 23 conducted, including its origin, authorizations, and errors made by Mr Hansen which lead to incorrect  
 24 accusations, reporting, and very poor conclusions. I had a brief meeting with my immediate supervisor a few  
 25 weeks prior to Mr Hansen's notification of his part in the Reduction of Force, along with other Protection  
 26 Officers. In this meeting I made my supervisor aware of the large mistakes being made by Mr Hansen, as well  
 27 as describing him as a "Narcissistic and egotistical individual with delusions of grandeur".

28 I am more than willing to assist and provide any intellectual knowledge I may have, as well as any physical  
 29 evidence that may be helpful in this matter. I would also like to have the opportunity to discuss, in my  
 30 opinion, how current security management caused and procured Mr Hansen's activities and beliefs, and how  
 31 some of the accusations made by Mr Hansen to his and Martin Tripp's Attorney were established. This is the  
 32 main reason I am bypassing the normal chain of command and reaching out to you.

33 Thank you for your time.  
 34 Ken

35 Ex. 3.

36 Valerie Workman was Tesla's Associate General Counsel, Compliance, in August of  
 37 2018. Ms. Workman testified that at first, she was investigating the allegations raised by Mr.  
 38 Hansen in his August 3, 2018 email to Mr. Musk, Ex. 4, *supra*, but then she began to investigate  
 39 Mr. Hansen himself after she received Mr. Davis's email to Mr. Musk, Ex. 3, *supra*:

40 485:10 Q. Did you do it in response to the  
 41 11 e-mail that I showed you?  
 42 12 A. I know I did it in response to  
 43 13 speaking with Mr. Davis. I can't recall if I  
 44 14 also used that e-mail that you just showed me,  
 45 15 but I spoke directly to Mr. Davis. And it's on

16 the basis of my conversation with him that I  
 17 conducted the investigation into Mr. Hansen's  
 18 e-mail.

3 Thereafter Ms. Workman testified that she witnessed Mr. Hansen on Fox News on August  
 4 29, 2018,<sup>1</sup> discussing his SEC TCR allegations against the Tesla Parties:

5 **492:13 Q. And was it -- did everyone at**  
 6 **14 Tesla -- was that the talk of the company the**  
 7 **15 next day?**

8 **16 A. I think it was the talk of the legal**  
 9 **17 team. I don't know that it was the talk for the**  
 10 **18 company, but it was certainly a buzz.**

11 **19 Q. When you say "the talk of the legal**  
 12 **20 team," who was talking about it?**

13 **21 A. Colleagues in the room. It was big**  
 14 **22 news. It was on the media. Everybody. I mean,**  
 15 **23 everybody --**

16 **24 Q. So tell me what everyone was talking**  
 17 **25 about. Tell me what -- when you went like that,**

18 **493:1 Hansen v. Elon Musk - Arbitration Day 2**  
 19 **2 tell me what they were saying.**

20 **3 A. It was an allegation on Fox News that**  
 21 **4 actually -- there's someone actually talking in**  
 22 **5 the news to Fox News about allegations against**  
 23 **6 Tesla. That was huge.**

24 ...

25 **496:9 Q. So August 23rd is when the eyes**  
 26 **10 started turning at Mr. Hansen and what he might**  
 27 **11 have done?**

28 **12 A. I don't remember the date I spoke to**  
 13 **13 Mr. Davis, but it was Mr. Davis raising concerns**  
 14 **14 about Karl Hansen to me that caused me to look**  
 15 **15 into his e-mail.**

16 **16 Prior to that, I was investigating**  
 17 **17 Mr. Hansen's concerns.**

18 **18 Q. And nobody was asking you to do**  
 19 **19 anything before that; correct?**

20 **20 A. Before I start --**

21 **21 Q. Like prior to, say, August 3rd, no**  
 22 **22 one was asking you to investigate Mr. Hansen;**

27 <sup>1</sup> Hansen appeared on the Fox Business Network on August 29, 2018, to discuss the SEC  
 28 complaint. Ex. 6, <https://video.foxbusiness.com/v/5828313541001#sp=show-clips>.

1 Emphasis added.

2 Critically, Ms. Workman testified that she did the following in chronological order:  
3 received the allegations from Ken Davis, who raised concerns to Musk and Jones because Mr.  
4 Hansen was an SEC whistleblower working as a contractor at the Gigafactory; started  
5 investigating Mr. Hansen rather than his allegations, because Ken Davis raised concerns to Musk  
6 and Jones about Mr. Hansen being an SEC whistleblower working as a contractor at the  
7 Gigafactory; saw Mr. Hansen on Fox News on August 29, 2018, talking about his SEC  
8 allegations against the Tesla Parties that were “the talk of the legal team” and “certainly a buzz”  
9 at a time when Tesla was in a truly “perilous situation,” as per Mr. Nocon; and then reached out  
10 to Jeff Jones and asked for prompt validation of Mr. Davis’s allegations that, until that time, had  
11 not warranted immediate scrutiny by Tesla’s Head of Global Security.  
12

13 Tesla Human Resources Senior Manager Jenna Ferrua testified that in August of 2018,  
14 Tesla had roughly 70,000 employees, but for unexplained reasons, Tesla’s Associate General  
15 Counsel, Compliance, its Head of Global Security, its Deputy General Counsel (Yusuf  
16 Mohamed), and Ms. Ferrua convened on an expedited basis to remove Hansen, an hourly  
17 contractor whose singular notoriety was that he was an SEC whistleblower who had been on Fox  
18 News on August 29, 2018, talking about his SEC allegations a from all Tesla contracts.  
19

20 USSA’s Matt German received a call from Jeff Jones directing German to remove  
21 Hansen from all Tesla contracts, effective immediately. Transcript 556:1-19. Tesla did not  
22 inform German the reason for Hansen’s removal, only that “Karl was no longer welcomed on  
23 Tesla property.” *Id.* German, as USSA’s corporate representative, testified that but for Tesla’s  
24 direction, there was no reason USSA would have removed Hansen on September 4, 2018, from  
25 the Tesla Contract at the Gigafactory. Transcript 560-561. He was earning \$19.80 per hour x 40  
26  
27  
28

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hours per week at the Gigafactory when he was removed. Mr. Hansen then took some time off and resumed working at USSA at another location on October 4, 2018, but at a lower hourly rate of \$15 per hour, and worked there for the twelve weeks remaining in 2018.<sup>2</sup> In 2019, Mr. Hansen worked for U.S. Security at \$15.00 per hour through January 13, 2019.<sup>3</sup>

Mr. Hansen left U.S. Security on January 13, 2019, and had brief employment in 2019 with Silver Legacy and BCH Gaming. His 2019 W-2 forms report \$6,898 from Silver Legacy and \$8,174 from BCH gaming. In early 2020, Mr. Hansen began employment with the Federal Government that included a wage and benefits package but is less than he should have earned when he was supposed to start his original employment with U.S. Security in July 2018. Accordingly, Mr. Hansen was earning \$19.80 per hour before he was removed from all Tesla contracts, and then USSA paid him \$15.00 per hour afterward. He left USSA after 18 weeks on January 13, 2019, and he began working for the federal government in approximately February 2020, approximately 73 weeks later.

## **LEGAL STANDARD**

“To survive a Motion to Dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). At the Motion to Dismiss stage, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff.” *Id.* Where a plaintiff presents such a pleading, a Motion to Dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6) must be denied. To foreclose litigation of

<sup>2</sup> Hansen's income for those twelve weeks should have been  $\$7,200 = 12 \text{ weeks} \times \$15.00 \text{ per hour} \times 40 \text{ hours per week}$ .

<sup>3</sup> Hansen's earnings for those two weeks should have been  $\$1,200 = 2 \text{ weeks} \times \$15.00 \text{ per hour} \times 40 \text{ hours per week}$ .

1 an issue under collateral estoppel: (1) the issue at stake must be identical to the one alleged in  
 2 prior litigation; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated in the prior litigation; and (3) the  
 3 determination of the issue in the prior litigation must have been a critical and necessary part of  
 4 the judgment in the earlier action. *Clark v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc.*, 966 F.2d 1318, 1320 (9th  
 5 Cir. 1992); *Washington Mut. Inc. v. United States*, 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).

6

7 **ARGUMENT**

8 **I. The Retaliation Elements under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Act  
 9 Differ Substantially.**

10 Hansen asserted claims under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer  
 11 Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203 (“Dodd-Frank”) in arbitration, and SOX and Dodd-Frank have  
 12 dramatically different elements, different standards of law, and different standards of evidence.

13 Dodd-Frank prohibits an employer from discharging, demoting, suspending, threatening,  
 14 harassing, directly or indirectly, or in any other manner discriminating against a whistleblower.  
 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (h)(1)(A). It explicitly protects the activity of “providing information to the  
 16 [Securities and Exchange] Commission...” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i). Courts have applied  
 17 traditional whistleblower burden shifting frameworks to Dodd-Frank, holding that to state a  
 18 whistleblower retaliation claim under the Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6, a plaintiff must  
 19 show that: “(1) plaintiff engaged in a protected activity, (2) plaintiff suffered a materially adverse  
 20 employment action, and (3) the adverse action was causally connected to the protected activity.”

21 *Hall v. Teva Pharmaceutical USA, Inc.*, 214 F. Supp. 3d 1281, 1289 (S.D. Fla. 2016) citing 76  
 22 Fed. Reg. at 34304 n.41. Once a plaintiff establishes a *prima facie* case of retaliation under  
 23 Dodd-Frank, the defendant needs to offer some legitimate non-retaliatory reason for the adverse  
 24 action. If the defendant meets this low burden, the plaintiff may argue that the reason given is  
 25 pretextual in nature and that the true reason was retaliatory. In its construction, the Dodd-Frank  
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1 Act utilizes the phrase “because of” to describe the causal connection that must be established  
 2 between the adverse action and the protected conduct; in other words, the Dodd-Frank Act  
 3 utilizes by statute a ‘but-for’ causation standard. *EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.*, 575  
 4 U.S. 768, 772-773 (2015); *University of Texas Southwestern Med. Ctr. V. Nassar*, 570 U.S. 338,  
 5 350 (2013); *Lawrence v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp.*, 2017 WL 3278917 at \*11 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).  
 6

7 The elements of a *prima facie* case differ under SOX in three substantial ways. First,  
 8 SOX protects a far wider range of activity, including but not limited to providing, causing to be  
 9 provided, or otherwise assisting in an investigation regarding any conduct that they reasonably  
 10 believe violates any law or regulation of the SEC concerning fraud against shareholders to any  
 11 regulatory or law enforcement agency, member of Congress, or anyone with supervisory or  
 12 investigative authority over the employee. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, *et seq.* Second, SOX requires  
 13 only that Plaintiff prove “the protected activity was a contributing factor in the unfavorable  
 14 action.” *Rhinehimer v. U.S. Bancorp Invs., Inc.*, 787 F.3d 797, 805 (6th Cir. 2015) (emphasis  
 15 added). Third, and critically, SOX provides a statutory burden shifting procedure that differs  
 16 significantly from other whistleblower protection statutes, including Dodd-Frank. In *Kim v.*  
 17 *Boeing Co.*, No. 11-35879, 2012 WL 5351230 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2012) (case below ALJ No.  
 18 2010-SOX-22), the Ninth Circuit declared that “SOX whistleblower claims are governed by a  
 19 burden-shifting procedure under which a plaintiff is first required to make out a *prima facie* case  
 20 of retaliatory discrimination. Then, ‘if the plaintiff meets this burden, the employer assumes the  
 21 burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same  
 22 adverse employment action in the absence of the plaintiff’s protected activity.’ *Van Asdale v.*  
 23 *Int'l Game Tech.*, 577 F.3d 989, 996 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added).” *Kim, supra*, slip op. at 2.  
 24 In other words, under SOX: the range of protected activities is wider, the burden for proving a  
 25

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1 causal connection is substantially lower, and the burden of production shifts to Defendant in a  
 2 wholly different fashion.

3 **II. The SOX Retaliation Elements were Neither Litigated Nor Resolved at Arbitration.**

4 SOX's evidentiary burden significantly differ from Dodd-Frank's, and Judge Hoffman  
 5 did not the shifted evidentiary burdens present in a SOX claim because Judge Hoffman was not  
 6 presented with a SOX claim to evaluate. Hence Hansen's SOX claims cannot be dismissed  
 7 because resolving claims on Dodd-Frank's inapposite elements, and burdens of proof do not  
 8 meet the requirement of the determination of the issue in the prior litigation. *See Clark*, 966 F.2d  
 9 at 1320; *Washington Mut. Inc*, 636 F.3d at 1216; *Greenblatt*, 763 F.2d at 1360. To the extent  
 10 these issues might have been considered, SOX's inapposite elements and burdens of proof were  
 11 not critical and necessary elements in the arbitration decision because they were never  
 12 considered.

13 **A. Protected Activity**

14 There are two types of activity protected by whistleblower protection statutes. When a  
 15 witness contributes to an investigation, either through testimony or filing of a complaint, they  
 16 engage in *participatory* protected conduct. *Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville*  
 17 and *Davidson County, Tenn.*, 555 U.S. 271, 274 (2009); *see also* EEOC-CVG-2016-1(II)(A)(1).  
 18 When one opposes or objects to illegal activity, with or without a filing, it is *oppositional*  
 19 protected activity. *Crawford*, 555 U.S. at 274; *see also* EEOC-CVG-2016-1(II)(A)(2). Under  
 20 anti-retaliation statutes, “[p]articipatory activities are vigorously protected” because such  
 21 activities are “essential to the machinery set up by” the statutes in question. *Laughlin v.*  
 22 *Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority*, 149 F.3d 253, 259 & n.4 (quoting *Hashimoto v.*  
 23 *Dalton*, 118 F.3d 671, 680 (9th Cir.1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Oppositional  
 24

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1 activity, however, “serves a more limited purpose.” *Sias v. City Demonstration Agency*, 588 F.2d  
 2 692, 695 (9th Cir.1978). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has held that “opposition” requires that  
 3 an employee’s act of opposing illegal actions be “legal” and “reasonable in view of the  
 4 employer’s interest in maintaining a harmonious and efficient operation.” *Silver v. KCA, Inc.*,  
 5 586 F.2d 138, 141 (9th Cir.1978) (citations omitted).  
 6

7 Only participatory activity is protected Under Dodd-Frank, as the statute only protects  
 8 “any individual who provides... information relating to a violation of the security laws to the  
 9 [Securities and Exchange] Commission...” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6). However, under SOX,  
 10 some activity that would traditionally be considered oppositional is protected to the exact same  
 11 extent as participatory conduct, as the statute extends protection to any who even provides  
 12 information to their supervisor. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) *et seq.* Importantly, SOX does not  
 13 require that the whistleblower be correct that the conduct they are reporting actually constitutes a  
 14 violation of law, only that the whistleblower reasonably believes it to be the case. *Id.*  
 15 “[O]pposition activity is protected when it responds to an employment practice that the employee  
 16 reasonably believes is unlawful.” *EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union*, 424 F.3d 397, 406-07 (4th  
 17 Cir. 2005) (citing *United States ex rel. Wilson v. Graham County Soil & Water Conservation  
 18 Dist.*, 367 F.3d 245, 255 (4th Cir. 2004), *vacated on other grounds*, 545 U.S. 409 (2005); and  
 19 *Nealon v. Stone*, 958 F.2d 584, 590 (4th Cir. 1992)); *see also Peters*, 327 F.3d at 320-21.  
 20 Hansen does not need to be right. When one raises a complaint in good faith, they do not need to  
 21 be correct; it is still protected activity. *Id.*  
 22

23 In his analysis of Plaintiff’s Dodd-Frank claim, Judge Hoffman concluded that Hansen’s  
 24 filing of his complaint with the SEC, which is the literal definition of participatory protected  
 25 activity under the statute, could not have been protected activity because Hansen’s concerns did  
 26

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1 not originate with him and Hansen did not know what was contained within Tesla's financial  
 2 statements. *Id.* From a legal perspective, this was completely wrong. Moreover, this cannot  
 3 preclude an issue under SOX, because while filings with the SEC *are* the only form of protected  
 4 activity under Dodd-Frank, they *are not* the only form of protected activity under SOX. 18  
 5 U.S.C. § 1514A, *et seq.* Moreover, SOX does not require that Hansen need be the genesis of  
 6 such concerns or know any details of Tesla's financial disclosures, only that Hansen reasonably  
 7 believed the reported conduct violated federal securities laws. *Deltek, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor,*  
 8 *Admin. Review Bd.*, 649 Fed. Appx. 320, 328 (4th Cir. 2016).

9  
 10 The issue of whether Hansen engaged in activity protected by SOX was not actually  
 11 litigated and was not a critical and necessary part of the arbitrated claims. Therefore, it cannot  
 12 be precluded by collateral estoppel. *Clark*, 966 F.2d at 1320; *see also Washington Mut. Inc.*, 636  
 13 F.3d at 1216; *Greenblatt*, 763 F.2d at 1360.

14

15 **B. The Arbitration Did Not Determine Whether Hansen Was Subject To Adverse**  
**Action or Suffered Damages**

16  
 17 Judge Hoffman specifically did not consider whether Hansen's reassignment was an  
 18 adverse action or whether he had suffered damages. Final Award at 7, n. 1 ("Respondents'  
 19 arguments that the reassignment was not an adverse action... and that Hansen failed to prove  
 20 damages are not analyzed here..."). Indeed, in his consideration at Summary Judgment, Judge  
 21 Hoffman noted that "Respondents do not argue that the reassignment is not adverse action."  
 22 Interim Award on Tesla's and USSA's Motions for Summary Judgment at 5, n. 4. At no point in  
 23 did Judge Hoffman evaluate whether Hansen suffered an adverse employment action as defined  
 24 under SOX. Hansen's reassignment constitutes adverse action under SOX, which specifically  
 25 prohibits discharge, demotion, suspension, threatening, harassing, or "in any other manner"  
 26 discriminating against an employee in part due to their protected activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a).

1 It is further undisputed that Hansen made less when he was removed from the Gigafactory.

2 The issue of whether Hansen was subject to adverse action and damages protected  
 3 against by SOX was not actually litigated and was not a critical and necessary part of the  
 4 arbitrated claims. Therefore, it cannot be precluded by collateral estoppel. *Clark*, 966 F.2d at  
 5 1320; *see also Washington Mut. Inc.*, 636 F.3d at 1216; *Greenblatt*, 763 F.2d at 1360.

6

7 **C. The Causation Analysis in SOX retaliation claims and Dodd-Frank Claims  
 8 Differ Substantially**

9 The Dodd-Frank Act utilizes the phrase “because of” to describe the causal connection  
 10 that must be established between the adverse action and the protected conduct; in other words,  
 11 the Dodd-Frank Act utilizes by statute a ‘but-for’ causation standard. *EEOC v. Abercrombie &*  
*Fitch Stores, Inc.*, 575 U.S. 768, 772-773 (2015); *University of Texas Southwestern Med. Ctr. V. Nassar*, 570 U.S. 338, 350 (2013); *Lawrence v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp.*, 2017 WL 3278917 at \*11 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). However, SOX requires only that Plaintiff prove “the protected activity  
 12 was a contributing factor in the unfavorable action.” *Rhinehimer v. U.S. Bancorp Invs., Inc.*, 787  
 13 F.3d 797, 805 (6th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added). A contributing factor means any factor which,  
 14 alone or in connection with other factors, tends to affect in any way the outcome of a personnel  
 15 decision. *See Rookaird v. BNSF Ry. Co.*, 908 F.3d 451, 461 (9th Cir. 2018); *Gunderson v. BNSF Ry. Co.*, 850 F.3d 962, 969 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting *Kuduk v. BNSF Ry. Co.*, 768 F.3d 786, 791  
 16 (8th Cir. 2014); *Allen v. Admin. Review Bd.*, 514 F.3d 468, 476 n.3 (5th Cir. 2008); *Marano v. Dept. of Justice*, 2 F.3d 1137, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

17 Judge Hoffman evaluated the evidence produced by Plaintiff according to the “but for”  
 18 causation standard upon which Dodd-Frank relies. Final Award at 5, 7. Whether there was a  
 19 causal connection between Plaintiff’s protected activity and Defendants’ adverse action under  
 20 SOX’s entirely different and significantly lower standard was not litigated and was not a critical  
 21

1 and necessary part of the arbitrated claims. Therefore, it cannot be precluded by collateral  
 2 estoppel. *Clark*, 966 F.2d at 1320; *see also Washington Mut. Inc.*, 636 F.3d at 1216; *Greenblatt*,  
 3 763 F.2d at 1360.

4 **D. Defendants' Defensive Burden Under SOX Does Not Exist in Dodd-Frank**

5 Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6, a plaintiff must show that: "(1) plaintiff  
 6 engaged in a protected activity, (2) plaintiff suffered a materially adverse employment action,  
 7 and (3) the adverse action was causally connected to the protected activity." *Hall v. Teva*  
 8 *Pharmaceutical USA, Inc.*, 214 F. Supp. 3d 1281, 1289 (S.D. Fla. 2016) citing 76 Fed. Reg. at  
 9 34304 n.41. Once the *prima facie* case is established, the defendant may proffer some legitimate  
 10 non-retaliatory reason for its adverse actions against the plaintiff. *Id.* If the defendant meets this  
 11 low burden of production, the plaintiff may still prevail by proving that the proffered reason is  
 12 pretextual and that the true cause, according to the aforementioned but for causation standard,  
 13 was retaliation. *Id.*

14 SOX's statutory burden shifting differs significantly from Dodd-Frank's. In *Kim v. Boeing Co.*, No. 11-35879, 2012 WL 5351230 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2012) (case below ALJ No.  
 15 2010-SOX-22), the Ninth Circuit wrote: "SOX whistleblower claims are governed by a burden-  
 16 shifting procedure under which a plaintiff is first required to make out a *prima facie* case of  
 17 retaliatory discrimination. Then, 'if the plaintiff meets this burden, the employer assumes the  
 18 burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same  
 19 adverse employment action in the absence of the plaintiff's protected activity.' *Van Asdale v.  
 20 Int'l Game Tech.*, 577 F.3d 989, 996 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added)." *Kim, supra*, slip op. at 2.

21 Judge Hoffman neither considered nor applied SOX's burden shifting when making his  
 22 Dodd-Frank liability determination. *See generally* Final Award. The issue of whether  
 23 Defendants' proffered reasons for taking adverse action against Hansen met the clear and  
 24

1 convincing evidence threshold mandated under SOX to rebut Hansen's *prima facie* case was not  
 2 litigated and thus was not a critical and necessary part of the arbitrated claims. Therefore, the  
 3 SOX claim cannot be precluded by collateral estoppel. *Clark*, 966 F.2d at 1320; *see also*  
 4 *Washington Mut. Inc.*, 636 F.3d at 1216; *Greenblatt*, 763 F.2d at 1360.

5 **III. It is Contrary to Public Policy to Allow Collateral Estoppel to Preclude the  
 6 Litigation Non-Arbitrable Claims by Claiming that the Non-Arbitrable Claims were  
 7 Precluded by Other Issues Addressed in the Arbitration.**

8 Defendants' reliance on *Clark* for the proposition that arbitration may collaterally estop  
 9 SOX claims is misguided, as *Clark* was decided a decade prior to the passage of SOX, which  
 10 *explicitly* bars binding arbitration of SOX retaliation claims. 18 U.S.C. § 1514(e)(2).<sup>4</sup>  
 11 Defendants cite no case law after the passage of SOX to support this assertion. Even if SOX's  
 12 prohibition of binding arbitration did not bar collateral estoppel via arbitration of entirely  
 13 different claims—a proposition that would frustrate the purpose of the statute which explicitly  
 14 forbids binding arbitration—a decision in arbitration cannot preclude SOX claims that were not  
 15 subject to the arbitration agreement.

16 “In civil litigation, where issue preclusion and its ramifications first developed, the  
 17 availability of appellate review is a key factor. [...] In significant part, preclusion doctrine is  
 18 premised on ‘an underlying confidence that the result achieved in the initial litigation was  
 19 substantially correct.’ [...] ‘In the absence of appellate review,’ [the Supreme Court has]  
 20 observed, ‘such confidence is often unwarranted.’” *Bravo-Fernandez v. United States*, 580 U.S.  
 21 \_\_\_, 137 S. Ct. 352, 358 (2016) (internal citations omitted); *see also Standefer v. United States*,  
 22 447 U.S. 10, 23, n. 18 (1980). It would undermine Congress's intent if a court were to allow an  
 23 arbitration decision to form the basis for dismissing on the basis of collateral estoppel claims

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 26  
 27  
 28 <sup>4</sup> “No predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable, if the agreement  
 requires arbitration of a dispute arising under this section.” 18 U.S.C. § 1514(e)(2).

1 arising out of a statute that explicitly prohibits resolution of same by binding arbitration. Such a  
2 decision would effectively eviscerate Congress's mandate that SOX whistleblower protections  
3 cannot be forced to be resolved through arbitration.

4 **CONCLUSION**

5 Defendants have not satisfied the required elements of collateral estoppel doctrine. In  
6 light of the foregoing, their Motions to Dismiss should be denied.  
7

8 Dated: September 6, 2022

Respectfully Submitted,

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## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

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